I. Historical Flashback
Since 1955, Sudan has tried to trot out its tremendous terrains and ethnic contrasts. Through its capital, Khartoum, the state employed stringent force to manage the surrounding zones and control any sort of resistance or revolt. But Sudan’s contemporary history is also marked with several military overthrows, since 1958. The final one came in 1985, with Omar al-Bashir’s alliance of the military and religious militants and consequently the toppling of Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Since then, President Al-Bashir appointed himself as chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for National Salvation, joined forces with the Islamists to reinforce his power, and implemented Islamic law, which also led automatically to increased tensions with the Christian-majority in South of Sudan. In 1993 he was officially appointed as the president of Sudan. Since that time, Sudan was included within the lists of state sponsors of terrorism, and later the United States started imposing sanctions against the Sudanese government.
Ten years later, in 2003, rebels in Darfur began to rise up against the Bashir regime and its violations, to which the Bashir regime responded with violent attacks toward South of Sudan, and so came the regime’s use of the Janjaweed militia force heightening the tension to an extreme crisis level that was often compared to the Rwandan genocide. The war resulted in atrocious loss of lives to violence, hunger and famine, and then eventually came the secession of South Sudan. The International Criminal Court issued a warrant for the arrest of Bashir in 2009 on charges of committing crimes against humanity in Darfur and was thought of a historic step. However, the ruling was not implemented, and in 2010 he was re-elected, receiving 68% of votes in the first multi-party elections since he came to power. This in turn affected the turnout of the 2015 elections, the first election after the official independence of South Sudan, which as marked by a mass boycott and which Bashir also won by a landslide majority.
II. Calls for a New Political Path
The rise of the Sudanese political Islam within the 1990s led to the alienation of voters in the south and in rural areas and was solely for people who joined the religious movements whether voluntary or by force, who were not lucky enough to flee from Khartoum. Economic distress also gripped the country despite Sudan’s vast richness of natural resources. The country was exposed to its greatest economic challenge after the independence of South Sudan, as it contained the southern oil fields that constituted three-quarters of the country’s drilling. In 2016, the government began reducing fuel subsidies, which sparked public anger and mass demonstrations took to the streets.
During the anniversary of the popular uprising of 1985, on the 6th of April, the Sudanese Professionals Association called for demonstrations through the social media with the aim of removing al-Bashir and his regime and calling for economic and social reform. The security committee, consisting of the army, the Rapid Support Forces, the security apparatus, and the police, eventually arrested Al-Bashir and senior officials of the ruling regime, and Al-Bashir was sentenced to two years in prison for corruption.
The Sudanese people were still unsatisfied with these steps. The revolutionaries objected to the measures and demanded the fall of the Deputy Prime Minister, Major General Ahmed Awad bin Auf, chanting “Down again”, stressing the importance of a civil rule. In July 2019, they resisted attempts to thwart the revolution by using various peaceful to express their adherence to their ten basic priorities, which included the commitment to the civil political path. In August 2019, the sit-in ended with the success of the opposition coalition and an agreement to form a civil-military sovereign council that oversees a three-year transitional period to be followed by democratic elections, and Abdullah Hemedti was appointed Prime Minister.
III. Arab Support and Assistance
The Arab leaders were confused toward the Sudanese revolution and their intervention toward the crises was undirect. Geopolitically, the Egyptian-UAE-Saudi bloc is forming a strong Arab alliance towards the Arab region crises, which explains the visits of Hemedti to Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo. This step would be considered an important one toward building a strong alignment with this trio. For Egypt, it was obvious that the Egyptian system tried to support diplomatically the Sudanese System. However, after the beginning of the sit-in in front of the military headquarter, Egypt started through its experts as Hany Raslan, to explain to the Sudanese regime the importance of having an organized transitional phase. Raslan has described the transitional phase in Sudan in two points: the challenges of the economic growth and the fear of the resistance of loyal institutions. Geopolitically, Egypt worked hard during the last few years to maintain a sustained relation with Sudan. In August, Egypt hosts a delegation of Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF). So, it seems that unofficially, Egypt has played a role in the beginning of the transitional phase of Sudan
Despite the political unofficial support of Egypt, the Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates supported the economy of Sudan in different ways. First by deposing $500 million with the central Sudanese bank, and second, by paying $1 billion worth of petroleum products, wheat and products used by the agricultural sector that had been received officially. But recently, Reuters examination has discovered that an organization that Hemedti’s family claims was flying gold bars worth a large number of dollars to one of Gulf countries. This piece of information could be understood in two ways; the first is the continuous of the trade agreements and quick response of the Gulf States to support the enhancement of the Sudanese economic. The second way might shed light on the question of the Sudanese resources and Hemedti’s transparency and open the question of his alliance regarding the corruption of al-Bashir and the specter of accountability.
IV. A Stronger Wave: Sudan
Despite the current challenges that are facing the Sudanese revolution, the Sudanese brings new culture to the Arab revolutions in their second wave, by (I) making use of the contemporary revolutionary history, and (II) utilizing the political maturity of the Sudanese Professionals Association and the trade union and labor movement during the during the movement. It looks like that the Sudanese population wrote down three lists; before calling for manifestations; to reach a civilian transitional government deal; the first is a list of learning lessons from their neighbors, the second is a list of achievements to reach, and the third is a list of steps to follow, and they choose to stick to their lists even if there is no evidence that these steps would guide directly to the instantaneous success of their revolution. Briefly, five points could explain this variation:
- The revolutionary moment last longer than most of the Arab countries which reflects the insistence of reaching the main 10 goals before leaving the streets.
- The revolutionists’ agenda has shown the fact that there is a cultural growth and maturity of revolutionary groups (revolutionists agenda vs regime agenda).
- The first wave teaches new generations the importance of sticking to a peaceful demonstration.
- The Sudanese movements was against the Islamist political regime and all their direct affiliates.
- The Attempts of bringing the peripheries into the new order
V. Recommendation for The International Community
The transitional phase is too long, and it is unfair to start jumping to conclusions regarding the success of the Sudanese revolution, nonetheless, the Sudanese population has showed a deep knowledge and insistence towards his demands and it seems that a huge lessons were absorbed from the first vague of revolution. However, the role of the international community is important and could be significant in the current transitional political phase. A real understanding to the power of the Sudanese population is needed. Before the end of 2019, Sudan hosts an official meeting with various countries (from Europe, the Middle East and Africa) and international organizations (the UN, the EU, the AU and the World Bank), with the aim of discussing recent challenges and expected developments. Firstly, the Economic of Sudan is so fragile and needs the international support to face the economic crisis, the lack of change and the inefficient use off natural resources. Based on international estimations, Sudan needs up to $5 billion. Secondly, the educational assist, which means for example that more scholarships should be offered to the Sudanese youth, especially from their neighbors’ countries like Egypt. Thirdly, security, justice and civilian rule are three main focuses for the Sudanese revolution, that’s why any international intervention should take these basics into consideration.
